INTRODUCTION I
N 1948, FLINT, MICHIGAN, was more than the backdrop for a Michael Moore movie. 1 While it may be difficult to imagine today, Flint was then a prosperous industrial center. The American automobile industry, with its associated auto dealers, commanded an important position in the nation's economy. With that position came wealth and political influence, but also, in the immediate post-war period, industry concern about the degree to which the government would control the peacetime economy.
A few key individuals operated at the intersection of the auto dealers and politics, one of the most prominent being Flint's own Arthur Summerfield, an active partisan Republican, leader in the auto dealers' trade group, and the owner of the nation's largest Chevrolet dealership. If Summerfield were active today, federal laws and regulations would classify and regulate many of his activities. He was a key fundraiser for his party-a "bundler" or a "conduit" of campaign funds in modern parlance. His extensive contacts in Washington might also have qualified him as a lobbyist.
Even in the 1940s, Summerfield and his colleagues' activities were subject to a degree of regulation. Beginning in 1907 with the Tillman Act, Congress had enacted a series of laws limiting what individuals and corporations could do in federal elections. Those criminal provisions were rarely enforced, and guidance on their scope and application was elusive. 2 In 1948, the United States Department of Justice chose to prosecute Summerfield's auto dealers for making illegal corporate contributions to Michigan Republican party accounts, allegedly to influence federal elections. This article explores the events leading to that choice and the results of the prosecutions.
Although there is relatively little published research on campaign finance regulation prior to the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, the few scholars who have studied that earlier period have offered a number of theories to explain the general lack of federal enforcement that then prevailed, especially against corporations. 3 One explanation might be that corporations were unpopular targets for prosecution. Or prosecutors might have doubted the constitutionality of the law and therefore been reluctant to risk unfavorable precedent. Prosecutors were oftentimes political figures themselves, so perhaps political pressure explained the lack of prosecutions. A final possibility is that few corporations violated the law.
Given the scarcity of published decisions and primary source research, these explanations have been largely speculative. As a rare exception to the usual lack of enforcement, could the Michigan prosecution effort of the late 1940s help us understand better the Department of Justice's enforcement posture, and help us decide which explanation is strongest? On occasion, the exception proves the rule. Maybe this is one such occasion.
Part I reviews the meager enforcement history of the corporate contribution ban, and discusses what conduct a corporate executive in 1948, such as Summerfield, would have expected the law to reach. Part II addresses the history of the auto dealers' prosecutions in detail, drawing on archival records from the trials, the FBI, and the Truman Justice Department. Part III then reviews the competing explanations for the government's timid enforcement summarized above, and analyzes to what extent the auto dealers' prosecutions help us evaluate their validity.
ENFORCEMENT PRECEDENTS AND THE SCOPE OF THE CONTRIBUTION BAN

Enforcement
Federal law prohibiting corporations from making contributions in federal political campaigns dates to 1907 and the Tillman Act. 4 Almost a decade later, a federal district court sustained the constitutionality of the Act in United States v. United States Brewers' Association. 5 In that case, brewing companies and their trade association faced prosecution for a conspiracy to violate the Tillman Act's contribution ban. Brewers had been active in state politics for decades, fighting prohibition laws as well as state and local taxation, but the rise of prohibition as a federal issue prompted their entry into federal campaigns. 6 Their cultural association with Germans and Catholics also made them an appealing political target.
In 1914 roughly 100 Pennsylvania brewing corporations and associations were indicted for conspiracy to violate the Tillman Act. 7 The defendants moved to quash the indictments, asserting that the federal contribution ban was unconstitutional. 8 The Brewers decision upheld the law, using extremely deferential reasoning that would be wholly at odds with modern constitutional analysis. 9 The Brewers Court, for instance, found nothing vague in the Act's prohibition of "a money contribution in connection with any election." 10 The Brewers opinion made quick work of the litigant's constitutional claim, stating that the law "neither prevents not purports to prohibit the freedom of speech or of the press." Why? "Its purpose is to guard elections from corruption and the electorate from corrupting influences in arriving at their choice." 11 The district judge concluded: "I am of the opinion that . . . Congress kept within its constitutional powers. Were I in doubt upon this question, I would resolve that doubt in favor of the constitutionality of the Act." 12 Unsuccessful in their constitutional challenge, the brewers entered pleas of nolo contendere and were fined. 13 There were no more reported decisions applying the corporate ban for another 47 years. In the interim, Congress expanded the prohibition to include expenditures as well as contributions and extended it to include contributions and expenditures by labor organizations as well as corporations. 14 There were a handful of prosecutions against unions, but the first reported decision in a case against a corporation was United States v. Lewis Foods, for vi-olating the expenditure ban. 15 Enforcement of the original corporate contribution ban was scarce after Brewers and, so far as reported decisions are concerned, nonexistent. As Edwin Epstein noted: "between 1916 and 1948 it may be said that the Tillman Act was, as a practical matter, moribund." 16 The same, it seemed, could be said of the period from 1948 to the 1970s.
Yet beginning in 1948 there was one exceptional effort to prosecute corporate contributors, as the Department of Justice indicted three groups of Michigan automobile dealers for making illegal corporate contributions to a state party committee in 1946 and 1948. 17 There is no obvious reason why the Michigan auto dealers should have been the exception, as the contributions were not large, the activity at issue arguably violated state rather than federal law, and there were no strongly sympathetic facts to alleviate prosecutors' concerns about the constitutional questions around the law. Because the auto dealers prosecution seems anomalous, perhaps its record can help us understand the dearth of enforcement, to which it was an exception.
Scope of the contribution ban: Contemporaneous views
Given the vague statutory language and scant case law, what would a corporate executive have believed the law prohibited? That changed over time. In the wake of the Brewers decision, one writer opined that the government enjoyed broad constitutional powers to restrict corporate activity, as well as activity of other organizations. 18 "Statutes regulating the expenditure of money in elections should receive a liberal construction in order to effectuate the intention of the legislature" contended this author. 19 Through the 1920s doubts about the constitutionality of the corporate contribution ban focused on the federal government's limited power to regulate elections for presidential electors (who were considered state officers), primary campaigns, and until the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, elections of Senators by state legislatures. 20 Free speech claims were not discussed. For the states' part, a tabulation of state regulations published in 1928 reported that 34 states prohibited corporate contributions and two additional states specifically prohibited contributions from insurance companies. 21 In the 1936 election cycle, the Democratic Party published the Book of the Democratic Convention 1936, which featured lavish (and expensive) advertisements from corporations. 22 The Party sold the book, and a number of large purchasers were corporations. 23 After a congressional committee investigated the convention book as a violation of the Corrupt Practices Act (at the request of the Republican party), Congress prohibited these specific kinds of purchases in the Hatch Act Amendments of 1940. 24 But no new prosecutions followed. This incident suggests that there was no consensus in the 1930s on the degree to which the ban on corporate contributions permitted these transactions. 25 The major campaign finance reform theme during the late 1930s and 1940s instead involved the 29 In February 1948, the Justice Department commenced a prosecution of the CIO for making illegal political expenditures. 30 In March, the district judge dismissed that indictment, holding unconstitutional the expenditure ban. 31 In June, the Supreme Court affirmed, but construed the expenditure ban as not applying to the CIO's actions. 32
THE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS PROSECUTION
As the 1948 political season commenced, many corporations and corporate executives were actively engaged in politics. One might expect that some number would bend the rules to help their favored candidates. How widespread was disregard for the law? How easily was it circumvented? The story behind the Auto Dealers prosecution suggests some answers. Michigan politics and the auto dealers: 1948. By 1946, the beating Republican candidates had taken through the Great Depression was subsiding in Michigan. 42 Key support for Republicans in Michigan as well as nationally came from the auto industry, 43 which was in dramatic transition from war production back to the manufacture of civilian goods. As late as January 1945, the Office of Price Administration (OPA) was still reducing the quota of automobiles rationed to the civilian market. 44 Bearing in mind that the last new automobiles dated to 1942, as rationing persisted into 1945, the market tightened practically to oblivion. 45 Japan's surrender in August 1945, was accompanied by the reintroduction of a civilian automobile industry.
Political context
National
But persistent governmental regulation of the market made political influence an enormously important goal for the automobile industry, as the OPA retained significant control over the industry. OPA kept new car prices at their 1942 level 46 and dictated to whom these cars should be sold. 47 Public demand for automobiles was, no surprise, greatly in excess of supply. 48 Meanwhile, price controls pitted automobile dealers against manufacturers over how much discount the OPA would allow dealers and, accordingly, how much of any increase in costs would be borne by dealers rather than manufacturers. 49 By the end of 1945, manufacturers had produced only 75,000 cars. The OPA had predicted 240,000 would be built. Manufacturers produced scarcely enough automobiles to supply two to each of 33,000 car dealers. 50 Price and production curbs burdened Michigan's sales tax revenue stream, since lower prices meant lower tax payments. 51 Additionally, price controls encouraged black market transactions, so some sales went unreported (or reported at a lower price than that actually paid), denying the state its full tax. Automobile sales tax collections had been a problem in Michigan even before price controls, 52 but the controls exacerbated the problem.
People were desperate for automobiles. Dealers set up waiting lists, but crafty individual purchasers placed orders for new cars from several different dealers and then resold the cars at a premium to customers further down the priority lists. 53 On the black market, an automobile was often transferred to a used car dealer who sold this "used" car outside the new-car limits, at $200 to $300 over the ceiling. 54 Some dealers would also sell (illegally) the choice positions on the top of the priority lists. 55 Organized rings of purchasers could buy new-model automobiles in Detroit, above the legal price if necessary, and drive them to Southern states and sell them for an even higher premium. 56 One report described a Detroit-area spotter who followed a driver into church and arranged to buy the churchgoer's newmodel car during services. 57 Publicly, "this practice [was] condemned by automobile dealers . . . and [would] be watched very carefully. Anyone attempting to transfer his order to someone else [would] lose his priority." 58 Yet consumers wanted cars and, as the OPA's controls through 1946 continued to distort the automobile trade, more purchasers (and dealers) tolerated the black market's risks. 59 In response, OPA announced more flexible pricing limits, but not by much. 60 OPA also hired more agents and focused enforcement on automobile dealers. 61 OPA begged purchasers who paid over the ceiling to report the seller, in which case OPA would refund the overcharge. 62 The compliant buyer suffered no penalty, and kept the car. The offending seller was liable for treble damages under the price control statute and its implementing regulations. 63 In the November 1946 election, as noted before, Republicans did well nationally, and won control of both houses of Congress. Truman then ended the remaining price controls. 64 Republican also posted strong returns in Michigan, and the state elected a political newcomer, Republican Kim Sigler, as Governor. 65 Sigler became prominent as the colorful special prosecutor assisting Judge Leland Carr's 1943 one-man grand jury investigation of corruption in Michigan state government. 66 prosecuted over 40 cases before he was fired in 1946, when, among other things, the investigation appeared to be closing around former Governor and Republican political boss Frank McKay. 67 Sigler used this controversy to launch his successful anti-corruption candidacy for Governor. 68 Sigler's chosen candidate for attorney general, Eugene Black, also won, and the Sigler administration seemed poised to solidify reform control over the state and the Republican Party. 69 However, after the election Governor Sigler trained his efforts on anti-subversive legislation and illegal sports gambling, rather than political corruption. 70 Sigler achieved national attention and praise as an anti-communist, testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee in early 1947 along with F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover, among others. 71 By contrast, Attorney General Black kept his focus on political corruption. Black's opportunity for prosecutorial distinction came with another oneman grand jury proceeding conducted by Judge W. McKay Skillman, investigating the "automobile sales racket" and the unpaid taxes automobile dealers owed the state on gray market income. 72 In November 1947, Skillman indicted nine automobile dealers for title fraud and tax fraud. The "purchasers" in the dealers' title paperwork included infants and dead people. 73 Although overcharging for new cars and undervaluing trade-in cars no longer violated federal price controls, these practices evaded the state sales tax. 74 Skillman's investigations proceeded alongside the Attorney General's own pursuit of back-taxes from auto dealers. 75 Governor Sigler was not pleased with this persistence. 76 Michigan Republican fundraising was "extremely well organized" under Flint auto dealer Arthur Summerfield. The auto dealer contributions were important to Republicans nationally as well as locally. 77 The party leadership in Michigan preferred that their Attorney General not pursue auto dealers. But Eugene Black had other ideas.
The "one-man" grand jury. A distinctive aspect of the auto dealers' story was the "one-man" grand jury. Under Michigan law, state judges, sitting alone, exercised "the inquisitorial powers traditionally conferred only on coroners and grand juries." 78 One scholar summarized the law as follows:
[I]t provides that any judge, including police judges and justices of the peace, on complaint of any person, sworn or unsworn, may use the subpoena, the power to punish for contempt, and the power to grant immunity . . . in an investigation of suspected crime, and may cause the apprehension of any persons . . . for further proceedings the same as upon formal complaint. 79 Judge-jurors could hire prosecutors, detectives, and other staff. 80 Given the broad discretion and power judges enjoyed under this procedure, conventional grand juries had "practically disappeared" in Michigan. 81 The one-man jury could act quickly MICHIGAN AUTO DEALERS PROSECUTION 183 and decisively, but in the wrong hands such power could be abused. 82 A judge who pursued a successful high-profile prosecution, as Homer Ferguson did as a one-man jury against corruption in Wayne County in 1939-41, would enjoy a major boost to his public career. Ferguson used his reputation from the Wayne County investigation to win a seat in the United States Senate in 1942. 83 
From state to federal investigation
As noted above, Governor Sigler opposed the Skillman one-man grand jury, but other developments also threatened the state investigations. The United States Supreme Court dealt a potentially substantial blow to Skillman's efforts in March of 1948, when it handed down In re Oliver. 85 The Court held that Michigan's one-man grand jury procedure, permitting a judge to take testimony in secret and, if (as in Oliver) he disbelieved the witness, immediately jail him for criminal contempt, unconstitutionally denied the witness the right to an open trial. 86 Some predicted that this decision would "take the teeth out of the law." 87 Less than a week after the Oliver decision, Attorney General Black nevertheless attacked Sigler's administration for hampering the auto tax investigation's funding. In a speech at which Sigler was present, Black asserted that this interference served auto dealers who had "made heavy contributions to the Republican campaign chest" in 1946. 88 In May, Black again accused the Sigler administration of collusion with auto dealers. 89 He publicly accused a "four-man Michigan gang"-Arthur Summerfield; former Governor Wilbur Bruckner, who represented the auto dealers; Wayne County Republican leader Frank Iverson; and Paul Graves, president of the Detroit Auto Dealers Associationof insuring through political pressure that delinquent sales taxes would not be pursued. 90 Black's incentives might have been factional, at least in part. The Michigan press reported rumors that Black either would file against Sigler in the September 1948 Republican gubernatorial primary or was "acting as hatchetman" for another potential candidate. 91 At this point, the Black/Sigler/Auto Dealers battle spilled into the national press. Drew Pearson, a nationally syndicated investigative columnist, reported that Black believed the auto dealers had given Republican contributions, via Arthur Summerfield, in return for lenient sales tax enforcement. 94 Fed up, Sigler announced he would no longer fund the grand juries. 95 Judge Skillman closed his grand jury investigation of auto dealers, referred his records to the local prosecutor, and simultaneously filed papers to seek the Republican nomination for Governor. 96 The Elliot one-man jury in Genesee County ceased operating on July 16. 97 The eventually successful Democratic hopeful for governor, G. Mennen Williams, began his campaign by criticizing Sigler's defunding of the investigative grand juries. 98 Attorney General Black responded to the closing down of the grand juries by announcing he would launch his own investigation of illegal contributions. 99 Black asserted that Republicans had raised funds from corporate sources in violation of state and federal law. 100 He accused Arthur Summerfield of "assessing" auto dealers for $250,000 in Republican contributions. 101 He revealed that the so-called "Summerfield Plan" named county Republican finance directors in each of Michigan's 83 counties, through whom all contributions flowed, whether to individual candidates or the party. Summerfield administered the distribution of the money. 102 Most finance directors were connected to the Michigan Auto Dealers Association, and solicited fellow dealers for contributions calibrated to their sales volume. 103 As an aside, Summerfield's plan resembled the assessment plan Mark Hanna used to raise funds during the 1896 McKinley campaign. 104 Summerfield, like Hanna, defended his plan as superior to funding by "political bosses," 105 in part because it included regular audits and drew on a broader base of support. Critics complained that Summerfield's plan placed Summerfield in complete control, and gave him power he could use to punish his political rivals.
As the summer wore on, Black promised reporters that the "auto rackets" investigations had unearthed "concealed political contributions on a big scale by corporations." 106 In an interview with an FBI agent, James Rice (an ally of Summerfield's) described the plan's purpose as "to obtain a volume of contributions" from a large number of people so that they could effectively combat political machines and the control of candidates by one or two people and to prevent those few persons "from buying favors by buying candidates. Justice Department would take up the federal issues. 107 Black was in a position to know, as he had been communicating since June with Justice Department prosecutors. 108 In early August, Black was called into state court to return auto dealers' records taken from the one-man grand juries; instead he dramatically handed them off to the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District, Thomas P. Thornton. 109 
The federal prosecution
Recently released files show that Attorney General Black's allegations had the close attention of Truman's Justice Department. From the outset, the corporate contribution investigation was under the supervision of Assistant Attorney General Alexander Campbell and key Justice aide Peyton Ford, who with Campbell reported directly to Attorney General Tom Clark. 110 Clark himself urged Campbell to "hurry up" the selection of a DOJ attorney to assign to Michigan. 111 The high-level attention is noteworthy when one reflects on the other priorities of the day. As the following details unfold, remember that as the auto dealers' investigations and prosecutions were moving forward, Campbell was also prosecuting cases against Communists, managing the consequences of Whittaker Chambers's testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee, prosecuting a painters' union for violations of the Corrupt Practices Act, investigating nepotism allegations, and managing the Truman Administration's dealings with the NAACP. 112 Ford, a key assistant to Clark, was also personally involved in the Chambers matter, among others. 113 The files amply demonstrate the enthusiasm of Campbell, Ford, and probably Clark for the investigation of the Michigan auto dealers, but also re- Oddly, all FBI memoranda indicate Black's first contact was with Deeb and make no mention of the earlier Thornton contacts. Deeb, in a later interview, recalled being skeptical of the claims thinking that "in all probability Black, after months of public claims and charges, was not able to deliver upon his claims and wanted to transfer the situation to the Justice veal that others involved thought that their tactics were imprudent. For one, on August 10 the Director of the FBI wrote the Attorney General resisting Campbell's August 6 request that 20 agents be assigned to the matter, so that simultaneous interviews could be made throughout the state. The Director complained that this would be contrary to the procedures followed in similar cases, and "will very possibly result in repeated unwarranted attacks on the Department and the reopening of other election matters on the part of Senator Ferguson." 114 Ferguson, up for reelection in 1948, headed a Senate subcommittee investigating commodities speculation by government officials. 115 Ferguson also was leading the Senate's investigation into Communist influence in the government, during which Ferguson and Clark had feuded openly in August about whether Ferguson's hearings had harmed the Justice Department's own investigations. 116 Federal prosecutors had reason to hesitate. The records Black produced showed something less than the grand-scale violations he had promised in his public statements. The U.S. Attorneys' initial review of a number of Auto Dealers Association materials showed that dealers had solicited and collected checks to the Republican State Central Committee at an August 27, 1945 Association meeting. 117 A few of these were illegal corporate contributions. A $500 contribution by Roy Burgess was made from the account of his dealership, Genesee Motors; another $500 made by Harry Woodin was drawn on the Lippincott Motor Sales account. 118 The Lippincott contribution check was later voided (the corporate records stated it was "not allowed by corporation") but other records revealed a second check for $500, made out to cash, with notations indicating it was a substitute contribution. 119 Similarly, the records showed that Peter Gavriloff made his $500 contribution using R&G Motor Sales funds. When that check was returned, Gavriloff contributed $500 personally and took reimbursement from his dealership. 120 A third dealer, Otto Graff, produced records showing a check for $500 drawn against his corporate accounts, with a "phony endorsement," which was cashed. 121 Many other dealers listed in the Association's books, including Arthur Summerfield, gave properly from their personal funds. 122 Before convening a federal grand jury in Detroit, U.S. Attorney Thornton told Campbell he had concerns about the investigation. 123 Thornton noted that FBI investigators had interviewed Black's recommended witnesses, but "the information furnished has been scanty to say the least." 124 Thornton hoped that the grand jury would be more successful in eliciting information, "and if not we then will be protected if inquiry is made as a result of [Black' 125 Id. 126 Id. Thornton wrote Campbell again on August 31, expressing his frustration over the quality of information Black had provided, consisting "almost entirely of conclusions and the Government's investigation therefore must of legal necessity from a factual standpoint cover the entire field under consideration." Letter from Thornton to Campbell, Aug. 31, 1948 (marked "PERSONAL"). Thornton then asked investigators to identify all individuals who contributed $500 or more to the Wayne County Republican Finance Committee, determine their corporate affiliations, and ask them whether the contributions were made personally. Memorandum from Director, FBI to Campbell, Oct. 12, 1948. If the donor said the contribution was personal, investigators were then told to check the corporate books. The FBI balked at this proposal, preferring instead to contact them first by letter, which Thornton opposed. Id. Campbell instructed the FBI to follow the direction of Thornton. Memorandum from Campbell to Director, FBI, Oct. 19, 1948. on Justice Department file documents, in Campbell's handwriting, show his confidence that the dealers "conspiracy" did exist. 127 The federal grand jury began to hear evidence in Flint on September 2, with the Michigan press paying close attention. 128 Among the first to testify was Mrs. Dudley Hay, a former Republican National Committeewoman whom Arthur Summerfield had ousted in his unsuccessful bid for Republican National Committee Chairman. 129 The grand jury also heard from auto dealer Peter Gavriloff, and Lyle Church, a Genesee County prosecutor and former County Republican Chairman. 130 Secrecy is supposed to accompany a federal grand jury investigation, yet on September 13 columnist Drew Pearson again divulged inside details. He claimed to have copies of contribution checks to the state Republican Party drawn on auto dealers' corporate accounts. 131 Two days later, the jury summoned a group of auto dealers to testify and to identify records. 132 Then, a month after hearing its first witness, on October 1 the federal grand jury indicted four auto dealerships and five executives for making $500 each in corporate contributions to the Republican Party in 1946, for a total $2,000 in illegal contributions. 133 Black promised his own state conspiracy warrants to issue "within a week" but this never occurred. 134 Although the small total sum would seem anticlimactic, these dealers had obscured their donations by making them personally, then seeking corporate reimbursement, and had also categorized the expenditures as tax-deductible business expenses. 135 Pleased with this news, Pearson again took to his column to credit himself with involving the Truman Justice Department in the matter. 136 Judge Frank Picard set their trial date for November 9, a week after the 1948 general election. 137 Democratic gubernatorial candidate G. Mennen Williams made good use of the "slush fund" scandal in the closing days of his campaign. 138 The investigation then moved to Detroit, where a second grand jury (also under U.S. Attorney Thornton) heard witnesses October 8 and 9. 139 FBI agents from the Detroit office interviewed Arthur Summerfield on October 7 and requested lists of contributors who had given to the Republican Party through him. Summerfield declined. 140 The FBI balked at interviewing indiscriminately 98 reported Republican donors of $500 or more, as Thornton had asked. 141 Attorney General Clark advised investigators instead to interview only those who showed some indication of having violated the law, and when was the case, to "call the parties before the G[rand] J [ury] ." 142 On October 22, the Detroit jury handed down five sets of indictments citing evidence of about $3,000 in illegal corporate contributions. 143 Eleven days later, Governor Sigler lost to G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams, who remained Michigan's Governor until 1960. 144 Many credited the state and federal investigations of the auto dealers for his defeat. 145 Sigler trailed other Republicans on the ticket and significant numbers of voters who voted for Dewey crossed over to vote for Williams. 146 
Auto dealers on trial
With the election now over, the first set of trials commenced against the Flint auto dealers at the Bay City, Michigan, courthouse. The case against Lippincott Motor Sales and its principals Blanche Lippincott and Harry Woodin began November 9, 1948. The Government contended that after the dealership cancelled an improper corporate contribution of $500, it substituted a $500 check made payable to "cash," which was then contributed to the Republican State Central Committee. 147 Lippincott's counsel responded that the corporate contribution statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 148 He cited U.S. v. CIO, and argued "the Court goes very far in holding a corporation, labor union or individual has the right, subject to regulation but not subject to prohibition, to spend money in political elections." 149 The court denied that motion, without prejudice. 150 After the government rested its case, defense counsel again argued that the corporate contribution ban was unconstitutional. 151 After summarizing the concurrence in CIO (which would have reached the constitutional question) he added:
Everybody recognizes that in the interest of maintaining purity of elections that Congress has the right to regulate perhaps by a ceiling on amounts, but I think we have been going off on a tangent in our thinking for a long time that we could make one rule for an individual and one for a corporation. The first amendment, in fact a great many of our amendments included in the Bill of Rights apply to corporations as well as individuals. 152 The court again denied Lippincott's motion for acquittal. 153 Whether the $500 in cash replaced the earlier illegal contribution was critical to the case
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and a jury question. 154 After deliberating less than an hour-and-a-half the jury acquitted the Lippincott defendants. 155 A second jury trial against R & G Motor Sales and Peter Gavriloff on November 10 went no better for the prosecutors. This company's records showed that Gavriloff had made a $500 personal contribution to the Republican Party, which he reimbursed by cashing a corporate check (the corporation's books classified it as "miscellaneous expenses"). 156 The defendants presented no evidence. Judge Frank Picard instructed the jury that the facts as presented constituted a violation and the jury should find the defendants guilty if they believed the facts.
About six hours later, Judge Picard called back the jury, frustrated that they had not reached a verdict. The jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" about fifteen minutes afterwards. 157 Picard, apparently furious, admonished the jury that "today you have done more to destroy the confidence of the people in trial by jury in Michigan than any group of twelve men or women I have ever seen. . . . How you could reach the conclusion you did, under the admitted and undisputed facts in this case, is beyond me." 158 In Washington, Assistant Attorney General Peyton Ford asked whether the jury had been "reached"-i.e., whether jury tampering had influenced the verdict. 159 His query stemmed from a note one trial juror sent Judge Picard, which noted that the jury knew "that money rules, so why pass a law that will cause a man to cheat and lie." 160 Additionally the group was "fed-up on price control, black market, etc. Saw the case as just another law to control man's liberties." 161 In the meantime, Campbell called the Michigan prosecutors to Washington. 162 In a handwritten note dated December 12, Campbell reassured Attorney General Clark that "We have 15 more cases for Grand Jury and are proceeding with them-as well as trying to make the big conspiracy." 163 Yet one month later, Michigan U.S. Attorneys Deeb and Thornton wrote a cautionary memorandum to Campbell. 164 After they related the acquittals of the Flint auto dealers and reviewed other corporate contributions made by Detroit dealers who had been indicted and Wayne County dealers who had not yet been indicted, Deeb and Thornton wrote:
There is no evidence indicating that in these instances where corporate contributions were made . . . , the contributions [were] other than voluntarily given or that huge sums of corporate funds were being poured into the State Republican Party campaign chest fund for the purpose of influencing a federal election. In addition no evidence of a conspiracy has been developed, and it is our view that such evidence cannot be developed for the investigation reflects that none exists.
It is noted that Section 251 [] makes no distinction between a large or small corporation. It prohibits corporate contributions generally. However, since the violations that do exist involve small dealer corporations, it is our view that these violations are technical in nature. 165 Thornton and Deeb noted that the intent of the federal prohibition was to "remove disproportionate influences exerted by means of large aggregations of money" and cited Elihu Root's famous expression of that idea. 166 They concluded from this his- HAYWARD 190 tory that "it is quite obvious that the statute is designed to prevent electioneering by mass organizations in a position to exercise tremendous power." 167 Deeb and Thornton advised Campbell that Black's claims had not been borne out, no evidence of a conspiracy existed, no huge sums of corporate money were pouring into the Republican Party, and that the 21 violations were technical. They believed any additional prosecutions would fail, and advised against further investigation. 168 Main Justice did not accept their advice. 169 The second group of indicted auto dealers, from Detroit, resolved their cases on February 3, 1949. U.S. Attorney Thornton dismissed the charges against the individuals in return for their corporations' pleas of nolo contendere. 170 Federal investigations continued into 1949. Edward Kane, the new U.S. attorney who had replaced Thornton, now a federal judge, continued to dispatch the FBI to interview dealers. Kane set the Genesee Motors trial for June 21, 1949, and the Otto Graff, Inc., trial for June 22, both in Bay City. 171 Graff and Genessee instead pled nolo contendere on June 20; the court fined Graff's dealership $750 and fined Genesee Motors $500. 172 The court dismissed the charges against the individual executives.
In April 1949 columnist Drew Pearson attempted to renew national interest in the scandal by rehashing the 1948 revelations, releasing information about several additional leaked contributions, and claiming "evidence of widespread violation of the Corrupt Practices Act." 173 Pearson admitted that Alexander Campbell was his confidential source in a later controversy unrelated to the auto dealers' prosecution and Campbell was quoted by others as saying he was "politically obligated" to Pearson. 174 So it may be that Campbell was Pearson's source in the auto dealers' controversy.
On June 29, the federal grand jury indicted eleven more auto dealerships for making corporate contributions to the Wayne County Republican Finance Committee. 175 Of these, eight immediately pled nolo contendere. 176 One dealership, FrostAvis Inc. and A. Robert Frost, pled not guilty. 177 Bryant Motors and Tom Boyd, Inc. initially stood mute, but later pled nolo contendere. 178 The in-MICHIGAN AUTO DEALERS PROSECUTION 191 dictment of each individual officer was, as before, dismissed. 179 In October 1949, Campbell again contacted the Detroit U.S. Attorney, Edward Kane, urging his office to investigate Ford dealers. 180 He also noted that the Park Dealership, which had pled nolo contendere in July as a part of the Wayne County group, was a Mercury dealership. Accordingly, Campbell insisted that Kane should investigate the corporate records of every Wayne County Lincoln and Mercury dealer. 181 Based on nothing more, Kane commenced investigating these fourteen dealerships in late November 1949. 182 Investigators found a $620 contribution on the books of Evans Motor Sales, because, as Stewart Evans explained, his accountants wrongly advised that corporate contributions were allowed. 183 Two other dealerships, Mel Hague and Harmon-Daniels, made corporate contributions in early 1948, which they charged back to personal accounts in September, no doubt out of sensitivity to the news of the other investigations. 184 The majority of those investigated were innocent of any wrongdoing. 185 Meanwhile, Alex Campbell resigned from the Justice Department in December 1949, to seek the Democratic Party nomination for Senate from Indiana. 186 U.S. Attorney Kane filed against the three dealers on August 11, 1950. Hague and Evans pled nolo contendere, while Daniels initially pled not guilty but on September 19 changed his plea as well to nolo contendere. 187 This final set of convictions marked the end of the investigation. 188 
Aftermath
Public attention to the auto dealers' scandal dissipated soon thereafter. With the collapse of used car prices in June 1949, black market and off-thebooks profits likewise evaporated. 189 Also, Michigan succeeded in bringing charges against several organized automobile sales rings. 190 Governor Williams appointed Eugene Black to the state Circuit Court, and Black ran successfully for a Supreme Court seat as a Democrat in 1955, in which he served until 1973. 191 Arthur Summerfield's political career continued apace as Republican National Committeeman for Michigan. 192 At the 1952 Republican National Convention, Summerfield delivered the Michigan delegation to Dwight Eisenhower and was soon after- HAYWARD 192 wards named RNC Chairman. 193 During the subsequent campaign Democratic operatives accused Republicans of assessing auto dealers for contributions in the 1952 cycle, much as the Summerfield plan had in 1948. 194 After winning the presidential election, Eisenhower named Summerfield Postmaster General. 195 
THE LESSONS OF THE PROSECUTION
In his 2006 article for this Journal on the history of the corporate contribution ban, historian Robert Mutch noted several possible explanations for the dearth of corporate contribution enforcement. Mutch noted that lack of enforcement could stem from the attitude of the times. Corporate contributions would be difficult to detect without prosecutors investing considerable scarce resources. Prosecutors may not have been inclined to bring such cases, if as Mutch relates, corporations posed (or seemed to pose) less of a threat in the 1940s and 1950s than in 1907. A wide array of other restrictions now applied to corporations. 196 Noted Mutch, "[s]omething like the 1907 Act probably could not have been enacted in the 1950s; being already in place, it was equally unlikely to be enforced." 197 Other scholars have had their own theories. Prosecutorial reluctance might have reflected doubts about the law's validity. The corporate and labor prohibitions were potentially unconstitutional in the eyes of some. 198 With regard to the expenditure ban, that would seem a reasonable concern as even in more recent times its constitutionality has been a continual source of controversy. 199 Commentators from the pre-FECA era observed that prosecutors and judges appeared uncertain about the entire statute, including the contribution ban. 200 "The obvious political overtones of the section coupled with its literal uncertainty would then result in a decision not to prosecute unless the section clearly applied," noted one. 201 Prosecutors could have feared for their own political well-being. As one author noted, vigorous prosecution "cannot be expected when the defendants are likely to be pillars of the community." 202 Prosecutors traveled in political circles, would be unlikely to prosecute their own donors, and could be deterred from pursuing rivals' donors by the potential that their own side would be pursued in retaliation.
Finally, prosecutions might have been few and far between because violations were rare. Corporate managers engaged in other forms of corporationsubsidized politics, if they wanted to, consistent with the statute, but avoided making contributions. So the statute may have worked, in that direct contributions to candidates became an unappealing way of using corporate funds for politics. The auto dealers' cases contain elements sympathetic to each of these theories to some degree. While corporations, especially big ones, may have seemed less pernicious after the war than before, auto dealers could have been an exception. The sales tax and black market scandals made headlines. The public would have been angered at the cheating that plagued the industry. Whereas ordinarily there may not have been much appetite to prosecute a series of small businessmen and women for small corporate contributions, the dealers may have seemed like "bad actors" capable of executing a broad campaign financing "conspiracy." However, if popular disgust or mistrust had been a factor in moving the prosecution forward, it did not carry into the courtroom. Once in court, prosecutors could not win a conviction, and jurors expressed distaste for enforcing this criminal statute against this kind of activity.
There were several occasions when prosecutors
